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Abstract 
 
Numerous studies have shown that choice can be influenced by expectations of regret or 
disappointment (or, for positive outcomes, of rejoicing or elation). Psychological 
researchers measure these expectations with self-report instruments, economists infer 
them from observed choice behavior. The present study examines whether the emotion 
postulates embodied in economic choice models correspond to expected and experienced 
emotions as measured by self-report. In a laboratory study (N = 50) of student 
participants playing real-money lotteries, we included questionnaire measures of 
expected emotions for each possible lottery outcome. These emotion measures are 
reliable and well-behaved, and modestly predictive of actual choices. They did not, 
however, conform well to the specific postulates of economic choice models, though they 
did show some of the juxtaposition effects proposed in such models.  Emotional reactions 
to decision outcomes may be better characterized by broad measures of positive and 
negative affect than as nuanced mixtures of distinct emotions. 
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  Research on the role of regret and related emotions in decision making stems 
from two distinct research traditions. The first originated in the work of economic choice 
theorists such as Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) and initially focused on 
regret. In later work Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Bell (1985) extended this analysis to 
include considerations of disappointment. These efforts aimed to improve the predictive 
validity of the economists’ standard Expected Utility model of choice by introducing 
consideration of anticipated emotions. We shall refer to them collectively as the Modified 
Expected Utility Tradition (MEUT). The second tradition, which we shall refer to as the 
Psychological Regret Tradition (PRT), originated in psychological inquiry into the 
antecedents and consequences of experiencing or anticipating feelings such as regret in 
connection with choice (see Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999; Mellers, 
Schwartz & Ritov, 1999; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002, for reviews). Studies in this 
tradition have established that the anticipation of regret can be a powerful force in 
shaping decisions (e.g. Simonson, 1992; Connolly & Reb, 2003; Zeelenberg, 1999).  
  In labeling the two traditions, we do not intend to suggest that either is a single, 
coherent body of testable theory. Both MEUT and (especially) PRT embrace a variety of 
empirical and theoretical claims. However, the conceptual and methodological 
commitments that characterize MEUT are importantly different from those that 
characterize PRT. Some of these differences appear to have been obscured by shared use 
of emotion terms such as “regret”, “disappointment”, and the like. In this paper we will 
examine the correspondence between the technical terms “regret”, “disappointment”, 
“rejoicing”, and “elation” as used in MEUT and the same words as used by everyday 
English speakers (and in PRT) to refer to emotions as actually experienced.    4 
  Work in MEUT aims to improve the predictive validity of the economists’ 
standard Expected Utility (EU) model (Savage, 1954). In this EU model, each possible 
decision outcome has a value or “utility” to the decision maker. The outcome the decision 
maker actually receives is jointly determined by (a) the alternative she chooses and (b) 
the state of the world that eventuates – for example, whether the toss of a coin in a 
gambling game yields a “head” or a “tail”. The decision maker is thought to know the 
probability of each of the relevant states of the world, and is thus able to assess the 
expected utility of each decision alternative. This expectation is thought to guide the 
decision maker’s choice between alternatives.  
  The core idea of MEUT was to preserve the idea of choice being guided by the 
expected utility of the outcomes, but to modify the utility of each outcome by introducing 
two comparison terms. First, the outcome was compared to what would have been 
received if the other alternative had been chosen. If the comparison was unfavorable, the 
utility of the focal outcome was reduced, if favorable it was increased. The terms “regret” 
and “rejoicing” were used to label these utility adjustments. Second, the outcome was 
compared to the expected value of the alternative of which it was an element. If the 
outcome fell below the expected value, its utility was further reduced, if above, it was 
increased. The terms “disappointment” and “elation” were used to label this second pair 
of adjustments. Thus in the decision problem shown in Figure 1, the utility of the 
highlighted $0 outcome is reduced both by comparison with the $20 a tail would have 
generated if Alternative 1 had been chosen (a “regret” adjustment), and  by comparison 
with the $25 expected value of Alternative 2 (a “disappointment” adjustment). 
Conversely the utility of the $50 outcome would be further augmented by a favorable   5 
comparison with the $20 payoff for a head under Alternative 1 (a “rejoicing” adjustment) 
and also by comparison with the expected value of Alternative 2 (an “elation” 
adjustment). (See also Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov, 1999). 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  MEUT uses the emotion terms for two purposes: to label utility adjustments in a 
theoretical model and to attach psychological meaning to them. However, no evidence is 
offered that individuals making these adjustments actually experience the emotions 
suggested by the labeling. It seems clear that MEUT theorists do, in fact, expect such 
psychological realism. For example, Loomes and Sugden (1986) claim that when an 
outcome falls short of or exceeds expectation “…the individual also experiences some 
degree of disappointment [or] … feels some measure of elation” (p.271: emphasis added), 
and that the regret and disappointment postulated in their model “… are natural human 
emotions, and ones that can be recognized through introspection” (p.281). Similarly Bell 
(1982) imagines a regrettable outcome as leaving the decision maker “… absolutely 
devastated, … angry and perhaps depressed” (p. 962). While such claims do not 
necessarily establish that the authors assume an exact correspondence between the way 
they use these emotion words and the way ordinary people do, they do suggest that 
technical and lay uses of the terms should roughly correspond. A central purpose of the 
present study is to examine the extent of this correspondence, particularly as researchers 
in the PRT tradition do interpret self-report measures in this way. 
  PRT shares with MEUT an interest in regret associated with decision outcomes, 
although it has found it useful to distinguish such outcome regret from regret associated 
with the decision process or the decision itself (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Inman &   6 
Zeelenberg, 2002). PRT also shares with MEUT the view that this outcome regret is 
centrally a result of a comparison process in which the actual outcome is compared to 
some referent. However, while models in the MEUT generally consider only one 
comparison outcome, the outcome of the foregone alternative, PRT has identified a 
number of other possible comparisons that can affect outcome regret: alternative 
outcomes that can be readily imagined (e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986), outcomes 
received by others (e.g. Ordóñez, Connolly & Coughlan, 2000), outcomes narrowly 
missed (e.g. Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen & Wilson, 2004), the predecisional status quo 
(Connolly, Ordóñez & Coughlan, 1997) and others.  
  After enjoying some initial empirical success (e.g. Loomes, 1988; Loomes, 
Starmer & Sugden, 1991), MEUT work associated with regret stalled following a 
demonstration by Starmer and Sugden (1993) that most of its empirical evidence was 
flawed by a laboratory artifact referred to as “event-splitting” 
1. (The artifact is controlled 
for in our design: see also Harless, 1992). Our concern here is not with further testing 
MEUT models of choice behavior, but only with the way that tradition conceptualizes the 
emotions people anticipate and experience in given situations. How closely do these 
claims correspond to the emotions people report anticipating and experiencing? We will 
use MEUT’s conceptualization of regret and related emotions, and its characteristic 
embodiment in a simple laboratory gambling game, to explore the relationship between 
the game’s payoff structure and the emotions participants expect, and actually 
experience, for different  outcomes.  
  MEUT models typically imply:   7 
a. Monotonicity:  Positive emotions increase, and negative emotions decrease, as the 
payoffs with which they are associated get larger. 
b. Juxtaposition:  Regret is determined (only) by comparison of an outcome with the 
outcome of the foregone alternative (i.e. by between-alternative comparison) and 
disappointment (only) by comparison with the expected value of the alternative of which 
it is a part (i.e. by within-alternative comparison). 
c. Mixed emotions: It is not possible to experience simultaneously both regret and 
rejoicing, or both disappointment and elation, associated with a given outcome. 
d. Null effects: When one outcome is equal in value to another with which it is to be 
compared, neither regret nor disappointment will be experienced, nor will elation or 
rejoicing. 
e. Emotional distinctiveness: Since regret and disappointment (and rejoicing and elation) 
are driven by different comparisons, they will not in general show large positive 
correlations with one another. 
 (A somewhat more formal statement of the postulates driving these implications is given 
in the Appendix). 
  In order to test these implications of the MEUT postulates we incorporated 
questionnaire self-reports of expected and experienced emotions into an otherwise 
standard MEUT experimental procedure. The hybrid experiment is described in the 
following section.   8 
    
Method 
Overview 
Undergraduate students participated in a three-part experiment, which culminated 
in their playing a lottery of their choice for real money, with a chance to win up to 
US$30. They first expressed preferences between twelve pairs of lotteries displayed in 
matrix format. They then picked one pair at random, and ultimately played the lottery 
they had chosen from this pair. For the selected lottery pair and its complement 
(described below), participants rated the emotions they would expect to feel if each of the 
six possible outcomes eventuated. Finally, they played their chosen lottery for real 
money. They were then paid any winnings they had earned, and completed the emotion 
scales again for the outcome they actually received. 
Task 
The experimental task presented the participants with a series of choices between 
two lotteries: Lottery A, which offered a 30% chance to win $30, and Lottery B, which 
offered a 70% chance to win a smaller sum: $6, $8, $10, $12 or $14. Lottery pairs were 
presented in two different matrix formats, which we refer to as “overlapped” and 
“disjoint”. An example of each format is shown in Figure 2 for the lotteries offering a 
$10 payoff for Lottery B. In disjoint format, Lottery A pays only if a number between 1 
and 30 is drawn, Lottery B only if a number between 31 and 100 is drawn, so the payoff 
ranges are distinct. In overlapped format Lottery B pays for a draw between 1 and 70, 
thus overlapping with the 1 – 30 payoff range for Lottery A. In the disjoint format, a win 
implies that the player would have received nothing if she had made the other choice, and   9 
a loss means that a win would have been ensured by making the other choice, thus 
maximizing the opportunity for within-column comparisons. In overlapped format these 
contrasts are less stark, at least for the outcomes between 1 and 30.These alternative 
formats are thought to facilitate the matrix-column comparisons proposed by MEUT 
(Harless, 1992).  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Our numbering convention for the six cells is also shown in Figure 2. Possible outcomes 
of Lottery A fall in Cells 1, 2, and 3, and are always $30, $0 and $0. Outcomes of Lottery 
B fall in Cells 4, 5, and 6. The non-zero B payoffs appear in Cells 4 and 5 in the 
overlapped format and in Cells 5 and 6 in the disjoint format, with $0 in the remaining 
cell.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from undergraduate business courses at a large 
university in the Southwestern U.S. with promises of course credit and a chance to win 
up to $30 in a gambling experiment that would take about 30 minutes. The experiment 
was described as part of a study of how people feel about simple money lotteries. It was 
made clear that winning money was a real possibility, and that the participants incurred 
no risk of losing their own money. Students volunteered eagerly and experimental sign-
up sheets were quickly filled. A total of 50 students participated. 
Procedure 
Participants were scheduled in groups of up to six per session, with an 
experimenter and one or two assistants running each session. All responses were 
anonymous, with (signed) consent forms and payment agreements kept separate from the   10 
(unsigned) experimental questionnaires. All participants in a session were seated in the 
same room in full view of one another.  
The experimenter first reviewed the written instructions for the experiment, which 
described the experimental procedures and the forms of display to be used. The purpose 
here was to preview the sequence of the experiment, and to explain the matrix form of 
display for the lotteries. It also introduced the response scales the participants were to 
use. The experimenter made a prominent show of a clear plastic cash-box containing 
several hundred dollars to add further credibility to the promise that winnings would 
really be paid in cash. The instructions also emphasized that there are no “right answers”, 
other than the participant’s thoughtful decision as to which lottery from each pair of 
lotteries he or she found more attractive.
2 
  The experiment consisted of three parts. In the first part participants were given 
booklets showing, one to a page, twelve pairs of monetary lotteries in matrix form, 
labeled “Lottery A” and “Lottery B” as in Figure 2. The pages were headed “Problem 1”, 
“Problem 2”, and so on; the participant’s “problem” on each page was to decide which 
lottery of each pair he or she preferred.  Participants were told that the lotteries would be 
resolved by randomly drawing a chip numbered from 1 to 100. Below the matrix was an 
eleven-point response scale running from –5 (labeled “Definitely A”) through 0 (labeled 
“No preference”) to +5 (labeled “Definitely B”). The participant was asked to indicate 
which of the two lotteries he or she preferred by circling one number on the scale. It was 
explained that 0 was a legitimate response only if the participant felt genuinely balanced 
between the two lotteries, and that if such a response were to be selected for real play the 
experimenter would resolve the choice by flipping a coin. The experimenter reminded the   11 
participants frequently to be careful in their choices since they would be playing one of 
these games for real in a few minutes.  The two $6 lotteries were repeated to allow 
assessment of test-retest stability. Problem order was arranged so that overlapped and 
disjoint forms alternated, the Lottery B payoffs were in neither ascending nor descending 
order, and the overlapped and disjoint versions of the same Lottery B payoff were spaced 
six pages apart. Participants completed these initial assessments in 5-10 minutes. 
  In the second part of the experiment each participant was given a 12-sided die that 
would determine which of the twelve pairs would be the “real” task, to be played for real 
money. The participant rolled the die, and was given two questionnaires, one 
corresponding to the problem he or she had selected for real play, the other the 
corresponding overlapped or disjoint form of the same Lottery B payoff. (We refer to this 
as the “sister” problem). For example, if the participant’s real-play selection was Problem 
1 (in which Lottery B was a $10 payoff, overlapped with A), he or she was given the 
Problem 1 and Problem 7 questionnaires, since Problem 7, the “sister” problem, offers a 
Lottery B with the same $10 payoff as Problem 1, but disjoint from A, as in Figure 2. 
  The questionnaires consisted of six pages, each showing the problem matrix with 
a different cell picked out in yellow highlighter. The participants were asked to imagine 
their feelings if they were to end up in this cell. For example, when Cell 1 (the $30 payoff 
from Lottery A) was highlighted, the participant was asked: “How would you feel if you 
had chosen Lottery A and a ticket between 1 and 30 was drawn (i.e. if you ended up in 
the yellow highlighted cell)?”  Six emotion scales were offered: Regret, Happiness, 
Disappointment, Elation, Sadness, and Rejoicing. On each the participants were asked to 
indicate how much they would feel this emotion, by circling one number on a six-point   12 
scale running from 0 (labeled “None”) to 5 (labeled “A great deal”). Each participant thus 
gave six emotion ratings for each of 12 possible outcomes: the six outcomes in the “real 
problem” payoff matrix and the six in the “sister problem” matrix. Completing these 
ratings typically took less than 10 minutes. 
  In the final part of the experiment the participant played the “real” lottery. The 
problem chosen earlier by rolling the die was presented again and the participant 
indicated whether or not he or she wished to change or keep the lottery originally chosen. 
(This option was not mentioned in the earlier instructions, to maintain incentive 
compatibility). After making a final choice, the participant drew a poker chip, numbered 
from 1 to 100, from a large cardboard box and showed it to the experimenter. Any 
winnings resulting from the participant’s choice of lottery and the chip drawn were 
immediately paid in cash, and the participant completed the six emotion scales a final 
time for the outcome actually received. They were then thanked, debriefed and released. 
Results 
Monotonicity 
A minimal test for useful emotion measures is that, other things equal, positive 
emotions should increase, and negative emotions decrease, as the payoff with which they 
are associated gets larger. We examine this property for the emotion ratings for Cells 4 
and 6. Each participant completed emotion ratings for all six cells of a disjoint and an 
overlapped problem presentation for one randomly selected value of $B. We can thus 
combine Cell 4 ratings from overlapped and disjoint formats to sample the entire B 
payoff range from $0 to $14 juxtaposed with a $30 A payoff, while a similar combination   13 
for Cell 6 samples the same B payoffs but juxtaposed with a $0 A payoff. Mean emotion 
scores for the two cells are shown in Figure 3. 
3 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  The self-report emotion measures appear broadly consistent with the 
monotonicity requirement. The three positive emotions (rejoicing, elation and happiness) 
all generally increase as payoff increases, while the negative emotions (regret, 
disappointment and sadness) all tend to decline. (The evidence here is admittedly rather 
coarse, since sample sizes are quite small. The suggestion of a peak at around $10 for 
elation is not statistically reliable, since only 7 participants drew the $10 B payoff, 7 drew 
the $12 payoff, and 11 the $14 payoff). 
Juxtaposition 
Figure 3(a) shows that, contrary to MEUT postulates, B payoffs are expected to 
generate similar levels of the three positive emotions whether they are juxtaposed with a 
$30 (Cell 4) or a $0 (Cell 6) A payoff (though, as we show below, an index comprising 
these three measures does show juxtaposition effects). Juxtapositions do appear to affect 
each of the individual negative-emotion measures, which are generally higher in Cell 4 
(A payoff $30) than in Cell 6 (A payoff $0) (see Figure 3(b)). As postulated by MEUT 
expected regret is higher for a $0 B payoff when it is juxtaposed with a $30 A payoff 
rather than with a $0 A payoff (M = 3.12, 1.84; paired t-test, t(49) = 4.69,  p < .001). 
Similarly, expected regret for positive B payoffs is higher when the payoffs are 
juxtaposed with the $30 A payoff than with the $0 A payoff. (Aggregating all positive B 
payoffs to improve sample size: M = 1.32, 0.58; t (49)= 3.63, p < .001). However, similar 
differences are also found for disappointment (for $0 B payoff: M = 3.36, 2.64;   14 
t(49)=2.95,  p < .005; for positive B payoffs aggregated: M = 1.06, 0.34; t(49) = 3.67, p < 
.001), and for sadness (for $0 B payoff: M = 2.40, 1.90; t(49) = 2.33, p < .024; for 
positive B payoffs aggregated: M = 0.62, 0.32; t (49)= 2.23, p < .031). The data in Figure 
3(b) thus support MEUT’s postulated juxtaposition effect for regret, but show a similar 
effect for other negative emotions such as disappointment and sadness.  
Mixed Emotions 
For two-option choices MEUT postulates that, since rejoicing is associated with 
column winners and regret with column losers, the same outcome cannot simultaneously 
generate both regret and rejoicing. Similarly, an outcome cannot simultaneously generate 
both disappointment and elation. Our data suggest that these postulates do not hold for 
expected emotions as measured by self-report. For example, Figure 4 shows mean 
expected rejoicing for Cells 1, 4, 5 and 6. (Cells 2 and 3 are not plotted. They invariably 
pay $0, and invariably show low mean levels of expected rejoicing: 0.38 and 0.40 on our 
0-5 scales). Cell 1, a consistent $30 payoff and a consistent column winner, is plotted 
against Cell 4 payoffs, contrast with which would be expected to show rejoicing effects – 
that is, the $30 payoff should generate more rejoicing when the B payoff is $0 than when 
it is $14. Figure 4 shows predictably high levels of expected rejoicing in Cell 1, the $30 
payoff, (mean = 4.29), but with no evidence of a juxtaposition effect from the size of the 
Cell 4 B payoff. The rejoicing at the $30 payoff in Cell 1 is independent of the payoff 
available in Cell 4. 
However, expected rejoicing plots for Cell 4 (always a column loser) and Cells 5 
and 6 (never column losers) are indistinguishable from one another. All rise steadily with 
payoff, reaching values above 3.0 for the $10, $12 and $14 payoffs, clearly violating a   15 
strict reading of the MEUT postulate that rejoicing is a distinct emotion associated only 
with column winners. The Figure 4 data suggest more plausibly that self-reports of 
rejoicing should be interpreted as reflecting overall utility, positively related to payoff 
size and unaffected by inter-alternative comparisons. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 Recall also from Figure 3(b) that participants expected modest but non-zero 
levels of regret for the Cell 4 payoffs, so both rejoicing and regret were associated with 
these intermediate-value payoffs. Similarly, Figure 3 shows that several Cell 4 payoffs 
are expected to generate non-zero levels of both disappointment and elation, again 
violating MEUT postulates. While the extreme outcomes ($30 and $0) are expected to 
produce only positive or only negative emotions, intermediate outcomes are, in many 
cases, expected to produce mixtures of both. Again it is difficult to reconcile these self-
reports of mixed emotions with a strict reading of MEUT postulates. 
Column and Row Ties 
In the overlapped version of the matrix, a column tie occurs between Cell 3 ($0 A 
payoff) and Cell 6 ($0 B payoff). MEUT postulates, wrongly, that no regret will be 
expected in either cell. In fact participants expected moderate levels of regret in both cells 
– means 2.14 (N = 49) in Cell 3, and 1.88 (N = 49) in Cell 6. Correspondingly, MEUT 
postulates that, given a row tie, disappointment will be equal in the two tied cells. We 
noted earlier, in discussion of Figure 3(b), that expected disappointment over a $0 
outcome in Cell 4 was significantly higher than expected disappointment over the same 
$0 outcome in Cell 6. In both tied cases, then, expected emotion strength clearly violates 
the postulates of MEUT.   16 
Emotional Distinctiveness 
MEUT postulates two distinct emotional continua: regret/ rejoicing, and 
disappointment/elation. This postulate can be tested by examining the expected emotions 
in Cell 5, which offers a range of B payoffs between $6 and $14 in both overlapped and 
disjoint problem formats. Pearson product-moment correlations among the six expected 
emotion measures are shown in Table 1. The “real” and “sister” problems provide quasi-
independent replications.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  The pattern of these correlations does not suggest that our participants make 
nuanced distinctions between regret and disappointment, or between rejoicing and 
elation. Rather the data suggest a simpler underlying structure: a “negative emotion 
cluster”, comprising regret, disappointment, and sadness, and a “positive emotion cluster” 
comprising rejoicing, elation, and happiness. Simple indices formed from these clusters 
show Cronbach’s alpha’s of between .74 and .85, reliabilities that many researchers 
would regard as satisfactory for measurement purposes. The scale intercorrelations are 
probably inflated by the measures’ proximity on the questionnaire, as well as by the 
likelihood that items in each cluster may reflect the overall outcome utility as well as a 
specific emotion. They are also consistent with more substantive psychological processes 
such as the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) and the “risk 
as feelings” work of Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch (2001), in which momentary 
affect might influence both choices and anticipated emotion ratings. Given the sample 
and measurement limitations of the underlying data, we do not propose to pursue this 
factor structure in detail here, but Table 1 does strongly suggest that, in contrast to the   17 
distinct emotions proposed by MEUT, anticipated emotions in this setting are better 
described in terms of two broader, less differentiated clusters, one of positive, the other of 
negative, emotions. 
  We also examined the realism of the emotional expectations reported by our 
participants. The evidence suggests that participants in this task were good at predicting 
their emotions. Correlations between emotions predicted before and reported after 
playing the chosen lotteries were large and positive: .92 for rejoicing, .95 for elation, and 
.96 for happiness; and .66 for regret, .76 for disappointment, and .75 for sadness (all 
significantly different from zero, p < .001). These correlations are rather higher for the 
positive emotions than for the negative emotions, perhaps suggesting that the latter are 
more complex and difficult to predict. Overall, however, the expectations on which most 
of our analysis has focused appear to be realistic: Participants’ predictions of how they 
would feel correspond reasonably well with their reports of how they actually did feel 
about the lottery outcome each actually received.  
Though predicting choices was not the primary focus of this study, we did 
examine the preferences participants expressed as a function of B payoff and presentation 
format (overlapped vs. disjoint). Unsurprisingly, the popularity of Lottery B increased 
steadily with increasing $B, from 26% when $B = $6 to 98% when $B = $14. Contrary to 
MEUT predictions (see Starmer & Sugden, 1993: 238), the disjoint form of Lottery B 
was consistently preferred to the overlapped form (t(49) = 3.30, p = .002 two-tailed). (See 
Table 2). 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]   18 
To check for format effects on anticipated emotions, we used the clusters 
identified in Table 1, and computed simple index scores for positive and negative 
emotion clusters for each cell of the payoff matrix, for both overlapped and disjoint 
formats. Cell means are shown in Table 3. They show clear effects for format. In addition 
to the obvious contrasts involving Cells 4 and 6 (where comparing overlapped and 
disjoint formats involves comparing a $0 payoff to a positive $B payoff), two other 
format effects were found. The $30 payoff in Cell 1 shows a marginally higher positive 
emotion score in overlapped format (Cell 4 = $B) than in disjoint format (Cell 4 = $0), 
the reverse of what would be expected if the larger contrast generated rejoicing. And the 
$0 payoff in Cell 3 attracted less negative emotion in the overlapped format (where Cell 6 
= $0) than in the disjoint format (where Cell 6 has a positive payoff $B), suggesting a 
contrast effect of the MEUT-regret type. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  Four other comparisons show these regret-type contrast effects. Positive emotions 
are reliably lower in Cell 4-overlapped than in Cell 6-disjoint, though both cells offer the 
same value of $B (M = 8.94, 9.86; t(48) = 2.52, p=.015). They are also lower in Cell 4-
disjoint than in Cell 6-overlapped, though both offer the same $0 payoff (M = 1.29, 1.88; 
t(48) = 2.18, p = .034). Negative emotion scores for these two cells show the 
complementary pattern. Cell 4-overlapped is reliably more negative than Cell 6-disjoint,  
(M = 3.06, 1.27; t(48) = 3.83, p < .001), and Cell 4-disjoint is more negative than Cell 6-
overlapped (M = 9.06, 6.51; t(48) = 3.89, p < .001). All four comparisons indicate that an 
outcome in Cell 4 (paired with an A outcome of $30) is reliably less positive, and more 
negative, than is the same outcome in Cell 6 (where it is paired with an A outcome of $0).   19 
There is thus considerable evidence that these coarse measures of overall positive and 
negative emotions do show between-alternative contrast effects of the type proposed in 
MEUT-regret thinking. 
  The data do not, however, show any support for the MEUT-disappointment  
proposal of within-alternative contrast effects. All $0 payoffs are, by definition, below 
the expected value of the alternatives in which they appear, so the MEUT-disappointment 
mechanism would predict more negative emotion for the $0 payoffs in Lottery A (EV = 
$9) than in the $6 version of Lottery B (EV = $1.80). Our data, however, do not show 
this for contrasts such as those between Cell 3 and Cell 6 (M = 6.94, 7.44; t(15) = 1.14, 
ns) or between Cell 2 and Cell 6 (M = 7.88, 7.44; t(15) = 0.54, ns) in overlapped format. 
To the limited extent that our data test MEUT-disappointment predictions, they offer no 
support. 
  In a final analysis we added a net (positive – negative) emotions score (NES) to 
the equation using $B alone to postulate preference for Lottery B. For the “real” 
problems, the prediction equation yielded an adjusted R
2 of .34 (F(2,46) = 13.29, p < 
.001), with significant beta weights for both $B and NES. For “sister” problems, the 
adjusted R
2 was .33 (F(2, 46) = 13.06, p < .001), with a significant beta weight for $B but 
not for NES. Measures of anticipated emotions, then, can help predict option preferences 
over and above knowledge of outcome dollar values alone. 
Discussion 
  These results support two main conclusions. First, asking experimental 
participants to report on their emotional expectations in connection with a decision they 
are about to make yields reasonable results. The measures so obtained are roughly   20 
monotonic in the monetary value of the outcomes, they cluster together in interpretable 
ways, they show clear evidence of inter-outcome comparisons, they correlate well with 
the actual emotions the participants report when they receive the outcomes, and they may 
aid in predicting preferences, beyond knowledge of dollar value of outcomes. They are 
thus not to be lightly dismissed as “cheap talk”, the standard economists’ complaint 
against self-report evidence of this sort.  
  The second conclusion is that the elements of the theory of specific emotions 
embodied in the Modified Expected Utility Tradition (MEUT) do not correspond very 
closely to the specific emotions anticipated and experienced by our participants, as 
measured by simple self-report measures. MEUT postulates that regret is driven by 
comparison of the outcome received to what one would have received by choosing the 
other alternative. We found such a juxtaposition effect, but it was not unique to regret. It 
appeared also in measures of disappointment and sadness. MEUT postulates that a given 
outcome may generate regret or rejoicing but not both, and disappointment or elation but 
not both; we found several instances in which participants expected mixtures of both. 
MEUT postulates no necessary correlations between regret and disappointment, or 
between rejoicing and elation. We found both pairs of measures significantly correlated. 
MEUT postulates that when the ticket drawn yields identical outcomes for both 
alternatives, no regret is experienced for either outcome. We found, to the contrary, that 
when the dollar payoff is low there is significant regret associated with both outcomes in 
such a pair. MEUT postulates that identical outcomes within an alternative will generate 
identical levels of disappointment.  We found such identical pairs showing significant 
differences in disappointment. In short self-report emotion measures such as those we   21 
used seem to yield reasonable, well-behaved results, but results largely inconsistent with 
the conceptualization of specific emotions proposed by MEUT.  
  Much better consistency is achieved if we relax the assumption of specific, 
discrete emotions such as “regret”, “disappointment” and so on, and consider instead 
broader, less differentiated clusters of positive and negative emotions. The 
intercorrelations among our measures strongly suggest that our subjects are using the 
emotion measures in this way. Further, scores based on such clusters show some 
important juxtaposition effects of the sort specified in MEUT-regret theory. (We found 
no support for the within-alternative comparisons proposed in MEUT-disappointment 
theory, but disappointment was not the primary focus of the experiment and our 
conclusions here are more tentative). We also found evidence that these emotion-cluster 
scores can help predict option preferences, beyond the prediction achieved using outcome 
dollar values alone.  
  We noted earlier that MEUT theorists use terms like “regret” both to label utility 
adjustments in a formal model and to attach psychological meaning to the adjustments. 
Our evidence supports the former usage, but not the latter. Comparisons across choice 
alternatives do indeed appear to modify outcome evaluations somewhat as MEUT 
proposes, and these modifications can affect overall preferences between alternatives. 
The modifications do not, however, appear to correspond to self-reports of regret, 
disappointment, sadness, and so on, but rather to less differentiated clusters of positive 
and negative emotions that may be indexed by the specific emotion scores. 
  The implications of these findings for work in the PRT are inevitably more piece-
meal, given the multiplicity of loosely integrated theories in this tradition. A theory of   22 
decision-related emotions that is both psychologically realistic and usefully predictive of 
choice will require: 
a. A reconsideration of the supposed distinction between regret and disappointment, at 
least as the two terms refer to the evaluation of specific outcomes. We have argued 
elsewhere (e.g. Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Reb & Connolly, 2004) that regret theories 
benefit greatly from a clear specification of what is being regretted. When the target is the 
decision process it is easy to imagine that the considerations that drive regret, such as the 
care and thoughtfulness of the process, might be very different from those that might 
associate disappointment with the process. Self-blame for a poor decision process is, we 
would argue, a hallmark element of decision-process regret. It is not clear that it is 
similarly central to the experience of disappointment. However when the focus of regret 
is, as here, on the outcomes themselves, it is plausible (and certainly consistent with the 
present evidence) that a single evaluative dimension compounding regret, 
disappointment, and general sadness is more appropriate. Earlier studies such as van 
Dijk, Zeelenberg and van der Pligt (1999) that show partial independence of regret and 
disappointment are based on measures that do not specify a target, and that are thus likely 
to tap feelings about both process and outcomes. Disappointment and regret about 
process may well be substantially independent of one another. On the present evidence 
they are substantially confounded when they refer to outcomes only. 
b. A reconsideration of the regret/rejoicing and disappointment/elation polarities. We 
know of no careful psychometric study establishing these polarities, and the evidence in 
the present study does nothing to reinforce their existence. We found situations in which 
participants assessing an intermediate-value outcome expected to experience mixtures of   23 
the supposedly polar emotions. The mixtures are not unreasonable. A given outcome 
might simultaneously generate both rejoicing (“$12 is nice pay for 15 minutes’ work”) 
and regret (“Too bad I didn’t collect that $30 big prize”).  
c. A reconsideration of the assumption that positive and negative emotions respond to 
situational factors in mirror-image ways. For example, most PRT researchers have 
assumed that a favorable comparison generates positive emotions while an unfavorable 
comparison generates negative emotions. Our finding was that all three of our negative 
emotion measures were influenced by comparison with the outcome of the non-chosen 
alternative, but none of the individual positive emotion measures were. This is consistent 
with several lines of evidence showing that negative outcomes stimulate more cognitive 
activity than do positive outcomes (e.g. Taylor, 1991; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) and 
that rejoicing and elation may be less potent than regret and disappointment, and less 
driven by comparison effects (Landman, 1987; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho & Ritov, 1997). 
(There exists a very extensive technical literature concerned with the structure of 
emotions, their distinctiveness, intercorrelation, and antecedents (for example, Frijda, 
1993; Russell & Barrett, 1999). In full development the issues raised here about decision-
related emotions will need to be integrated into that larger literature. Meanwhile we hope 
to achieve some progress towards the limited goal of predicting choices by the quite 
simplistic steps sketched here.)   
  The findings of our study are, of course, subject to the usual cautions concerning 
student participants performing unfamiliar tasks for small incentives under laboratory 
conditions. In the present case these concerns were somewhat mitigated by the use of 
procedures borrowed from economic experimentation: no deception of participants,   24 
transparent procedures, adequate financial incentives. We saw no evidence that any 
participants suspected that the experimental arrangements and payoffs were other than as 
described, and they all appeared to be highly involved and motivated to make careful 
decisions. The only significant disadvantages to following these procedures were that 
they limited the tasks we could use to simple gambling games, and that they imposed a 
budgetary constraint on the sample size we could use. Our self-report emotion data are, of 
course, quite limited. They reflect responses on simple one-item scales, with a given 
subject completing the same six scales repeatedly for 12 possible lottery outcomes. It is 
unlikely that the responses reflect deep thought or emotional nuance. They do, however, 
appear to be sufficiently robust to suggest useful directions for theoretical development. 
  Within the limitations noted our results weaken many of the assertions of MEUT 
as to when specific emotions will be experienced, at least to the extent that these 
assertions are tested by self-report data. At the same time they give significant support to 
the idea that cross-alternative comparisons of the MEUT-regret type are important. Both 
findings provide further grist for PRT’s descriptive mill. Our data suggest that 
participants do not make any great distinction between regret and disappointment in 
assessing their feelings towards different outcomes, but combine them with sadness into a 
single cluster of negative emotions (and, for elation and rejoicing, with happiness, into a 
single cluster of positive emotions). Both clusters appear to be roughly monotonic in the 
money value of the outcomes, but are not mutually exclusive, so that intermediate-valued 
outcomes may generate both positive and negative emotions. The emotions participants 
anticipate for particular outcomes correspond well to the emotions they report actually 
experiencing when those particular outcomes eventuate. And even coarse indices of these   25 
emotion clusters can contribute usefully to predicting actual choices. In short, our results 
suggest a descriptive model of decision-related emotions related to, but rather different 
from, that proposed by current MEUT. Significant work remains to establish the form 
and parameters of the new model, but if achieved it would represent a significant 
synthesis of two research traditions that are currently less connected than they appear.   26 
Footnotes 
1. The event-splitting problem can be visualized as follows. In Figure 2, in the disjoint 
format, there is no formal reason to separate the 31-70 draws from the 71-100 draws, and 
most experimenters presented the options as simply a 1-30 event (in which A wins), and a 
31-100 event (in which B wins). However, in the overlapped format, the distinction 
between 1-30 and 31-70 is required, so that the $10 payoff for Lottery B appears twice, as 
two subevents. This splitting of the $10 payoff into two events appears to have generated 
most or all of the preference shifts originally thought to have been generated by 
juxtapositions between the outcomes. See Starmer and Sugden (1993) for more extensive 
discussion. Note that, in our presentations of the payoff matrices, the B outcome is split 
in both disjoint and overlapped formats, so no artifact arises.  
2. Half the questionnaires included the following paragraph, which was also read aloud 
by the experimenter: 
“In making your choice between Lottery A and Lottery B, you might want 
to think about the emotions you would feel when the ticket is drawn. For 
example, how would you feel if you had chosen Lottery A and a ticket 
between 1 and 30 came up? How about if you had chosen Lottery B? 
Thinking about these emotions may help you to decide which of the two 
lotteries you find more attractive”. 
This allowed us to check for possible effects of priming respondents to think about their 
emotional reactions. All subjects in a given experimental session received the same 
priming instructions. The results showed no differences between primed and unprimed 
participants, and results were therefore pooled for all other analyses.   27 
3.  MEUT treats the total utility of an outcome as the sum of three terms: its “choiceless” 
utility, a regret/rejoicing utility and a disappointment/elation utility. It seems unlikely that 
a subject rating, say, her “rejoicing” at receiving a certain payoff would be able to 
separate the three elements and give a response reflecting only the second component. 
More plausibly (and consistent with our data) the rejoicing measure should be read as 
reflecting total outcome utility. Disentangling the component corresponding to the 
rejoicing term in MEUT thus requires comparison with other outcomes that are 
differently juxtaposed. For example, the rejoicing ratings for a $12 outcome in Cell 4 and 
in Cell 6 might both reflect the same choiceless utility (for $12) and the same elation 
utility (for exceeding the $8.40 expected value of the B lottery). However, the Cell 4 
outcome is juxtaposed with an A payoff of $30, while the Cell 6 outcome is juxtaposed 
with a $0 A payoff, so MEUT’s rejoicing component, if present, should be reflected in a 
difference between the Cell 4 and the Cell 6 rejoicing ratings (see Figure 4). Similar 
arguments apply to other emotion ratings in other cells. 
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Table 1: Correlations among emotion scores for Cell 5 in “real” and “sister” 
problems. 
 
      Regret       Disapp’t         Sadness           Rejoicing       Elation         Happiness 
Regret       1.00     .58**(.66**)   .56**(.35*)      -.17(-.26)       -.17(-.17)      -.11(-.18) 
Disappointment            1.00         .62**(.45*)      -.32*(-.41*)   -.16(-.16)      -.12 (-.29*) 
Sadness                                              1.00             -.28(-.20)      -.13(-.14)       -.10(-.24) 
 
Rejoicing                                                                1.00         .74**(.67**)   .63**(.67**) 
Elation                                                                                           1.00          .59**(.58**) 
Happiness                                                                                                           1.00 
 
(Cell entries are correlations for “real” problems, with “sister” problems shown in 
parentheses) 
For all cells: N = 49;  * = p<.05;  ** = p<.01   33 
Table 2: Proportion of subjects preferring A, preferring B, or indifferent, for  
 
overlapped and disjoint versions of the B Lottery. 
 
 
B lottery payoff    Prefer A  Indifferent  Prefer B       N 
           
    $6  Overlapped       78%       0%        22%  100 
      Disjoint       69%       0%        31%  100 
 
    $8  Overlapped       58%       0%           42%   50 
      Disjoint       48%       2%        50%   50 
 
    $10  Overlapped       12%       2%        86%   50 
      Disjoint        8%        0%        92%   50 
 
    $12  Overlapped        12%       0%        88%   50 
      Disjoint         4%       0%        96%   50 
 
    $14  Overlapped         2%       0%         98%   50  
      Disjoint         2%       0%        98%   50 
 
 
Note: Lottery A offers ($30, .3) and is relatively riskier. Lottery B offers ($B, .7), and is 
relatively safer. Both $6 lottery pairs were repeated, to assess test-retest reliability of 
preference scores, so sample size is 100 for these lotteries.   34 
Table 3: Positive and Negative Emotion-Cluster Scores by Cell for Overlapped and 
Disjoint Problem Formats. 
 
          Format         
      Disjoint        Overlapped  t(48)*         p (2-tailed) 
Positive Cluster: 
  Cell 1($30)    12.86     13.12    1.99    .052 
  Cell 2 ($0)      1.57       1.24   -1.63    ns 
  Cell 3 ($0)      1.41       1.49    0.30    ns 
  Cell 4 ($0/$B)     1.29       8.94   13.18    .001 
  Cell 5 ($B)      9.76       9.76     0.00    ns 
  Cell 6 ($0/$B)     9.86       1.88   -12.77   .001 
Negative Cluster: 
  Cell 1 ($30)      0.43       0.37       -.32    ns 
  Cell 2 ($0)      8.02           8.00    -.05    ns 
  Cell 3 ($0)      8.12       6.63   -3.18    .003 
  Cell 4 ($0/$B)     9.06       3.06   -10.15   .001 
  Cell 5 ($B)      1.24       1.24     0.00    ns 
  Cell 6 ($0/$B)     2.17       6.51     8.00    .001 
(*:paired samples)   35 
Figure captions 
Figure 1: Payoff matrix for a hypothetical coin-toss gambling game  
Figure 2: Payoff matrices in disjoint and overlapped formats when B payoff is $10, and 
cell numbering convention 
Figure 3(a): Mean positive emotion scores for Cells 4 and 6 
Figure 3(b): Mean negative emotion scores for Cells 4 and 6 
Figure 4: Mean expected rejoicing for Cells 1, 4, 5 and 6 as a function of cell payoff   36 
   
 
 
 
 
   Outcome of coin-toss 
 
Heads (p=.5)  Tails (p=.5) 
 
        Alternative 1        $20     $20 
  Player’s choice: 
         Alternative 2        $50     $0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Payoff matrix for a hypothetical coin-toss gambling game 
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Disjoint format: 
  1-30  31-70  71-100 
Lottery A  $30  $0  $0 
Lottery B  $0  $10  $10 
 
Overlapped format: 
  1-30  31-70  71-100 
Lottery A  $30  $0  $0 
Lottery B  $10  $10  $0 
 
Cell numbering: 
  1-30  31-70  71-100 
Lottery A  Cell 1  Cell 2  Cell 3 
Lottery B  Cell 4  Cell 5  Cell 6 
     
 
 
Figure 2: Payoff matrices in disjoint and overlapped formats when B payoff is $10, 
and cell numbering convention   38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3(a): Mean positive emotion scores for Cells 4 and 6
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Figure 3(b): Mean negative emotion scores for Cells 4 and 6 
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Figure 4: Mean expected rejoicing for Cells 1, 4, 5 and 6 as a function of cell payoff 
0
1
2
3
4
5
$0 $6 $8 $10 $12 $14
M
e
a
n
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
r
e
j
o
i
c
i
n
g
Cell payoff
Mean expected rejoicing for Cells 1, 4, 5 and 6
Cell 1
Cell 4
Cell 5
Cell 6  42 
Appendix: The emotional postulates of the Modified Expected Utility Tradition 
(MEUT). 
(Note: We have coined the term “MEUT” to refer to a body of work in economic models 
of choice associated with Loomes, Sugden, Bell and others, as described in the main text. 
A somewhat more formal statement of the main assertions of this tradition is presented 
here).  
Regret/rejoicing: Consider a payoff matrix such that, if state Si eventuates, the player 
receives $Ai if he chose option A and $ Bi if he chose option B. Let R(.) denote the regret 
and J(.) the rejoicing a player experiences on receipt of a given outcome in a given cell of 
the matrix. MEUT (e.g. Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) postulates: 
a. If Ai = Bi, R(Ai) = R(Bi) = 0, and J(Ai) = J(Bi) = 0. That is, there is neither regret nor 
rejoicing when column cells are equal, as only within-state comparisons can cause these 
emotions. 
b. If Ai > Bi, then R(Ai) = 0, and R(Bi) is positive and increases monotonically with (Ai- 
Bi); and conversely if Ai < Bi. Similarly, J(Bi) = 0, and J(Ai) increases monotonically with 
(Ai – Bi); and conversely if Ai < Bi. That is, regret is associated only with the column 
loser, and rejoicing only with the column winner, and each increases monotonically with 
the size of the win or loss. It follows that no outcome can have both regret and rejoicing 
associated with it. 
c. If, for a second state Sj, Ai = Aj and Bi = Bj, then R(Aj) = R(Ai) and R(Bj) = R(Bi). 
Similarly, J(Aj) = J(Ai) and J(Bj) = J(Bi). That is, both regret and rejoicing are associated 
only with the outcome itself and the column outcome with which it is compared, so if the   43 
same two outcomes occur in another column, the associated regret and rejoicing will be 
the same. 
Elation/Disappointment: Let E(.) denote the elation and D(.) the disappointment a 
player experiences on receipt of a given outcome in a given cell of the matrix. If the 
possible outcomes from lottery A are A1, …, Ai, Aj,…  and the lottery has an expected 
value of A*, MEUT (e.g. Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986) postulates: 
a. For any outcome Ai below the expected value, A*, E(Ai) = 0, and D(Ai) > 0 and 
increases monotonically with (A*- Ai). Also E(A*) = D(B*) = 0. That is, elation is 
associated with outcomes above EV, disappointment with outcomes below EV, and 
disappointment is monotonically increasing with the disparity between the payoff and 
expected value. 
b. If two outcomes Ai and Aj are equal, then E(Ai) = E(Aj) and D(Ai) = D(Aj). That is, 
elation and disappointment are influenced only by other possible outcomes of a given 
alternative, not by outcomes of other alternatives.   44 
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